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Abstract
We introduce a method, Lightweight Privilege Separation, enabling safe execution
of unreliable software. Our method introduces no new software vulnerabilities and is
fairly easy to implement. Furthermore, we show by experiments that the execution
overhead is in the order of milliseconds per execution of the unreliable process at
hand. We compare our method with earlier attempts of privilege separation such as
OpenSSH. The paper concludes with a discussion on generalizations of our approach
in the form of abstract machines and their interpreters.
1 Introduction
Development of large-scale network centric systems such as those envisioned
in, e.g., EC Sixth Framework Program (FP6) on Ambient Intelligence (AmI)
or IBM’s program on Autonomous Computing, presupposes that we will be
able to produce dependable software components and trusted execution envi-
ronments in the not so far future. In fact, there are calls within FP6 to that
end.[2] [1]
However, even if we can develop dependable components we still have to
face the challenge of safe execution of those components or even less reliable
software in dynamic and/or hostile environments, the topic of this paper.
1 Email: per.mellstrand@bth.se
2 Email: rune.gustavsson@bth.se
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1.1 Main Ideas and Highlights of the Paper
We describe in the paper design and development of LPS, a Lightweight Priv-
ilege Separation system that allows us to execute non-reliable C and C++
software components in a trusted way. Furthermore, we show that the added
overhead introduced is negligible. We also argue that our solution does not
introduce any new vulnerabilities as such, and that the added computations
are handled in a way that they do not introduce added faults in the execution
of the software. Last but not least, our solution does not rely on rewriting
on the software and is hence very cost-eﬀective. The paper also include com-
parisons with other approaches to techniques of privilege separation and some
pointers to further work.
Section 2 Lightweight Privilege Separation introduces the main ideas of
our proposed solution. That is, isolating execution of critical function calls
in a protected execution environment using the fork system call and proper
treatment of execution footprint and function call results. In the following
Section 3 Error Handling, we address issues related to errors that can appear
during execution of the forked processes and during its setup and completion.
Our experiments and tests are reported in Section 4 Experiments. Compar-
isons with other approaches of safe execution of unreliable software, notably
OpenSSH are addressed in Section 5 Comparisons. Our paper focus on on-
line support of secure execution of untrusted code. There are, of course, also
theoretical models towards that end, e.g., [6]. We address issues of interplays
between theory and engineering in Section 5 Comparisons as well. The paper
concludes with Section 6 Conclusions and Further Work.
1.2 Background
Much software used today in the Internet infrastructure is written in non
typed languages, as monolithic programs that execute partly or fully under
super-user privileges. Programs executing under super-user privileges intro-
duce aﬀordances that could be exploited by malicious code to cause harm.
Most software executing under super-user privileges require these privileges
only for a few operations. Hence, most operations can be carried out without
super-user privileges and many carried out even in a restricted environment.
It would be useful if we could separate an executing program into a privileged
and a non-privileged part, which is the exact purpose of privilege separation.
There are programs available today that use the concept of privilege separa-
tion to protect potentially risky code from the privilege-critical parts of the
same program. Typically, a vast majority of the code in such programs is
moved to the low-privileged part and a complicated client-server relation is
kept between the privileged and the non-privileged part. These programs are
designed with privilege separation as an initial requirement or has undergone
signiﬁcant modiﬁcations later in the development process to get this separa-
tion. In this paper we describe a method, lightweight privilege separation,
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that can be applied to separate privileges in existing and new programs with-
out the need of large redesigns. This method can eliminate the consequence
of many common security attacks when used properly.
2 Lightweight Privilege Separation
Functions are the central building block for programs written in the C pro-
gramming language. The whole life-line of a C program is deﬁned in the
function main. This function is called by the runtime environment when the
process has just started and the process is ended when this function returns.
The only way a library can expose its code to a C program is by the mean of
functions.
The concept of functions in programming languages are modelled after
mathematical functions. A function is expected to produce a return value
from zero or more parameters. A function that calculates its return value
based only on its parameters and that do not read or write any external state
information is called a pure function. Many functions encapsulating mathe-
matical functions are pure functions, such as the abs and sin functions found
in the C standard library. Most functions, however, need to read or modify
what we call the global state of the program. With global state we mean
a vector of entities S = {e0, . . . , en} that are not non-static local variables,
such as global variables, data in pointers 3 or operating system objects (ﬁle
descriptors, semaphores, etc.) exposed to the process.
Traditionally it has not been an issue which part of a state a function
modiﬁes during execution. This is clearly illustrated in older APIs such as
gethostbyname which modiﬁes a static buﬀer in the process as its main re-
turn value. With many modern operating systems supporting processes that
have several simultaneous execution points (threads) it became important that
functions should not modify static buﬀers that are shared between diﬀerent
threads of the process. Functions designed to work in a threaded environ-
ment are limited in which state components they may modify so that other
threads are not aﬀected by their execution. There is no way to automatically
determine which state a function modiﬁes as this might be dependant of run-
time conditions. Such a runtime condition can be a function in a network
server which dynamically allocates memory for data which it receives on a
socket from the remote host, and stores the pointer to this memory in a value
pointed to by a parameter.
2.1 State and Privilege Separation
Privileges in a Unix system are assigned on a process basis. This means that
the smallest entity which has the concept of privileges is a process. If a process
3 Strictly speaking, if the data pointed to by the pointer is a non-static local variable within
the function, the function is pure.
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has several threads, they all execute with the same set of permissions, even
if they are individually scheduled by the kernel. Because of this, a program
that executes with separated privileges must execute on several processes, it
is the only way to have diﬀerent sets of permissions of a process in a Unix-like
environment. A process is also the entity by which memory and operating
system objects are handled. This means that a ﬁle handle or memory address
in one process is not valid, or has another meaning, in another process. By
splitting a program in two (or more) processes, data written in memory in
one process is not reﬂected in the other unless some kind of synchronisation
mechanism between the processes is introduced to perform this. Due to the
complex nature of state sharing between functions in C programs, a program
with separated privileges must have some way of performing this synchroni-
sation, or be rewritten in a such a way that it does not rely on sharing state.
In general, we believe it would be diﬃcult to rewrite programs to achieve this
goal. A class of theoretical approaches of secure execution introduces wrap-
pers as a mean to control interactions between modules (e.g., [6]). However,
this approach introduces the problem of designing and implementing secure
wrappers, see Section 5 Comparisons.
2.1.1 Complex State
There are other types of state components than just memory that can be
shared between functions. For example, a function can open a ﬁle, pass a
reference, descriptor, of this ﬁle to another function, which reads or writes
data to the ﬁle and passes the descriptor to a third function, which closes the
ﬁle. As ﬁle descriptors are shared between the diﬀerent threads in a process,
the three functions could even execute in three diﬀerent threads and still share
this state. It would however not be possible to transparently use this code
in a program with separated privileges as the process boundaries would make
the descriptor that is valid in one of the processes invalid in the other. This
type of state dependencies are diﬃcult to keep track of and in some cases even
impossible. Fortunately, this type of state sharing is far less common than
sharing memory and can often be avoided by placing the boundary between
the privileged and the non-privileged process at a well-chosen place in the
code.
2.1.2 How Privilege Separation is Possible
The key mechanism that makes privilege separation possible is that of cloning
a process, which is provided in Unix-like operating systems through the fork
system call. This system call creates a new process that is an exact copy of
its parent with exception of the process id and parent process id. [3] The
newly created process (child process) has a copy of all attributes from its
parent. Should any state components be changed in one of the processes, the
state in the other one will not be aﬀected. Let one of the two processes switch
privileges and take the part of executing unprivileged code. The two processes
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maintain a controlled communication channel so that the main program can
continue executing code that need special privileges in one process, and code
that does not in another, and still keep shared state between the two processes.
Due to the complex state that is typically shared between functions, and
the need for privilege separated programs to execute in several diﬀerent pro-
cesses, it is not an easy task to create a privilege separated program. We have
investigated a method to separate privileges in programs without the need
to do large modiﬁcations in existing software or make signiﬁcant changes in
software development methodologies.
2.2 The LPS System
The purpose is to create a method that could be used to create privilege sep-
arated programs and to modify existing software to use privilege separation
without the need of signiﬁcant changes in development methodology and ex-
isting code. We wanted to avoid the use of special heaps to share state between
the diﬀerent processes as used in, for example, OpenSSH. [4] An assessment
of OpenSSH is given in Section 5 Comparisons.
Typically, there is a small set of functions that contain most of the vul-
nerabilities in a given program. For example, functions that parse data from
a human readable format into a machine readable format (parsers) have been
know to contain many vulnerabilities. This fact has been known for quite
some time and still there are new vulnerabilities found in parsers that have
already been reviewed several times. Many network servers need to parse a
user name and a password before they can switch to a lower privilege and
hence, some parsing of potential hostile input is done under super user privi-
leges. By placing code that we believe is more likely to contain vulnerabilities
in a low-privilege access environment, we can reduce the consequence if that
code in fact should contain a vulnerability and be exploited. By allowing the
majority of a program to execute under high privileges, and place restrictions
only on carefully selected parts, we can impose a privilege separation on the
most risky parts with minimal, if any, impact on other parts of the program.
We have implemented a library that enables the use of lightweight privilege
separation in a program executing in a Unix-like environment. The library
works as a wrapper between functions on either side of the privilege separation
fence. To apply this privilege separation to a process we rely on the abstraction
of functions and some basic assumptions on the structure of the host program.
When a non-pure function is called, it is likely that there are some re-
quirements on the global state. For example, a function parsing a user name
might expect that there is a textual representation of the user name stored
in memory, and memory allocated where the return data should be placed.
When separating privileges in a program we must make sure that all such re-
quirements are still met, or the program will not function as expected. There
can be very complex requirements on state in a program. It is not uncommon
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that complex algorithms are divided into several functions that communicate
by passing parameters and by modifying global state. There is no realistic
way to capture all requirements that a function has on the environment and
to transfer this state to a process. However, by cloning the process just before
the function is called, the operating system will copy the complete process
state.
Process 1
Function A
Function B
Function A
LPS Function B
Process 1 Process 2
Clone of
Process 1
Without LPS With LPS
By creating a clone we know that all of the state function B would have
had in process 1 is available in process 2. Unfortunately, this is not enough.
Because the purpose of executing function B in a separate process is to run
it with lower privileges than it would have had in process 1, we must ap-
ply restrictions to process 2 before transferring control to function B. Each
restriction we place on process 2 will make the environment slightly less iden-
tical to that of process 1. We previously mentioned that we make some basic
assumptions on the structure of the program. These assumptions are that
some privileges can be removed from process 2, and functions executed in the
restricted environment still will execute as expected. In our current working
version of LPS we apply three restrictions to the unprivileged process;
(1) Change of user id (UID) that the process executes under,
(2) Change of the group id (GID) that the process executes under, and
(3) Revocation of inherited ﬁle descriptors.
We believe that even more restrictions could be applied to the unprivileged
child under some circumstances. Such restrictions could be to change the
virtual ﬁle system root for the process (chroot) or applying other restrictions
supported by the kernel, such as jail, which is available in FreeBSD and
OpenBSD systems. Diﬀerent situations require diﬀerent types of permission
revocation and we have designed the LPS library so that it should be easy to
make modiﬁcations to which permissions that should be revoked. The reason
for revoking open ﬁle descriptors is that by default all open descriptors in the
privileged process are inherited to the unprivileged. Typically, connections
to data bases, LDAP directories and similar services communicate through a
ﬁle descriptor. The common practice for such services is that once the client
has authenticated (which could have been done in the privileged part), the
server keeps this authentication state for all following commands. There is
a risk that such a descriptor could leak into the unprivileged process. To
avoid this potential security leak we make sure all descriptors are closed by
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default. To maximize compatibility with existing code, LPS opens /dev/null
for standard input, output and error for the restricted process.
2.3 Data and State Transfer
The second main service provided by the LPS library is to capture state mod-
iﬁcations and return these to the privileged process in a secure way. Function
B could make a vast amount of changes to the state in process 2, and we
only want to transfer relevant modiﬁcations back to process one. We have
identiﬁed three diﬀerent types of state components to handle in a principal
way;
(1) State modiﬁed by function B that the privileged process need to continue
execution correctly. This state is transferred back to process 1. It is hard
to automatically determine which state is really needed by the privileged
process, but the engineer integrating the LPS system must manually
determine this for each case of privilege separation. In many programs it
is fairly easy to identify which state that falls into this category as many
functions only update state pointed to by one of its parameters, but we
are aware of more complex cases which require more manual work.
(2) State modiﬁed by function B that is not needed by the privileged process,
such as scrap buﬀers for temp data and buﬀers containing intermediate
data. This state may be ignored when transferring state back to process
1.
(3) Components that concern security and which must never be transferred
to the privileged process. An example of such a state component is a
variable indicating if the user has been authenticated or not. We must
make sure that this type of state does is not transferred back to process A.
As we do not trust the child process we should instead place the privilege
separation boundary so that a parsed version of, for example, user name
and password is transferred back to the privileged process which veriﬁes
if the user with these credentials should be authenticated.
Also, we need to do this state capturing without placing additional require-
ments on how function B should be implemented. To provide for all this, LPS
has a mechanism for saving state from the restricted process, transferring this
to the privileged process and applying it to the state of the parent process.
2.3.1 Saving State
LPS uses a serialization mechanism to identify which state components to
save from the restricted process. Serialization is a technique used in many
other programming languages and environments, such as Java and Microsoft’s
MFC foundation classes. The basic idea with serialization is that all state
components required by a program can be described in terms of the primitive
types provided by the programming language and the relations between such
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types. In the C programming language, all primitive types can be binary
copied between diﬀerent processes. When separating privileges at a certain
point in a program, the programmer must provide a list of state components
that the separated function may modify and that should be transferred back to
the privileged process. LPS provides mechanisms for transferring all primitive
types, raw buﬀers and C-style NULL terminated strings. LPS also supports
serialization of complex structures by callback functions that divide a structure
into its primitive parts. The LPS library provide both functions and macros
for specifying which state components that should be saved and transferred
to the privileged process. Typically only a few lines of code need to be added
to a program in order to specify which parts that should execute under lesser
privileges and which state that should be transferred. For example, consider
the call:
int result;
result = func( 23 );
where the function func only modiﬁes its return value. The same code, rewrit-
ten to take advantage of privilege separation:
int result, errorcode;
LPS_BEGIN_SEPARATION( ); {
result = func( 23 );
}
LPS_END_SEPARATION( errorcode,
LPS_DTYPE_INT( &result )
);
The LPS frame work will create a child process, apply security restrictions
and execute the function func in this environment. After this function has
ﬁnished execution the value stored in the result variable will be serialized and
transferred to the privileged process.
2.3.2 Transferring Data and Applying State Changes
The state serialized from the restricted process is transformed into an array of
bytes. These bytes are preﬁxed with information about size and an extended
error code, and transferred through an open pipe to the privileged process.
This pipe is represented by an open ﬁle descriptor in both processes, it is the
only descriptor in the child process that is not closed by the safety precaution
routines.
The ﬁnal step in returning to a state that the privileged process expects
is to read state components from the pipe and apply them. Before we can
do this we need to check that the data provided by the unprivileged child is
what we expect. We must assume that the child process has been exploited
and that the process is transmitting malicious data in an attempt to corrupt
the state in the privileged process as well. For this reason, the privileged
process performs a thorough security validation of the received data, that we
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will describe in more detail shortly.
LPS uses a simple binary protocol to transfer state data. The purpose of
this design is to avoid having to place a complex parser in the privileged code
and thus introducing unnecessary vulnerabilities. This design also gives per-
formance beneﬁts over using more complex protocols that need more parsing.
The data stream is divided into two parts, the head which only contains meta
information and a body part which contains the state that should be written.
Size Error Type 0 Data 0 Type 1 Data 1 Data N
Data Head Data Body
The data from the unprivileged process is read and validated by LPS as
follows;
(1) The body and head are read separately from the pipe by the privileged
process. Should there be no or too little data available to read LPS
waits a predeﬁned amount of time for data to be available. If no data
is available in this time LPS times out and returns an error to the host
program.
(2) After the head has been read, the size parameter is veriﬁed against a
minimum and maximum allowed value. This validation is performed to
make sure a compromised child process cannot cause a denial-of-service
against the privileged process by providing enormous amounts of data.
(3) If the size is acceptable the privileged process reads the speciﬁed number
of bytes and closes the pipe. There is a separate time-out value for this
operation as well.
(4) After this stage the body data is handled by the serializer. The serializer
knows which type of data to expect, from the deﬁnition given to the
LPS_END_SEPARATION macro, and veriﬁes element by element with the
type information in the stream. This might make little sense for primitive
types such as char and int but makes good sense when transferring strings
or buﬀers, to make sure the buﬀers are large enough to store the data
received.
(5) If these tests succeed, the data provided from the stream is written to
the state of the privileged process and LPS returns to the calling func-
tion. The state is now copied into the privileged process which resumes
execution as if there had been no privilege separation at all.
3 Error Handling
The mechanism for calling functions provided by the C programming language
cannot fail with an error code. The actual function that is called may return
an error value, but to the programming language runtime environment this
is a return value as any other. There is no way that the actual mechanism
for calling the function may return an error value that can be handled by
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the program. For this reason, all programs that we know of assume that the
actual calling mechanism will not fail, an assumption that we believe is fair to
make when developing programs. If errors should occur in the environment of
a program, preventing the call from being made (such as if there is no stack
space left), the program will typically crash 4 , but this is a very rare situation
in well-written programs.
The situation of error free function calls are very diﬀerent when applying
privilege separation to a program. The privilege separation will require re-
sources from the operating system, resources which might not be available.
If these resources are not available, the operating system will return an error
value to the LPS system. The privilege separation will also verify parameters.
These tests may show that the parameters are invalid. If this is the case,
LPS cannot let the execution continue but must have means to propagate the
error into the host program. We have identiﬁed four diﬀerent situations in the
privilege separation interface where errors can occur;
Before Creating the Child If the LPS system is unable to create a child
process (i.e. the fork system call fails) there is no context in which the
restricted function can be executed. It is not acceptable to execute the
function in the current process as this would circumvent the purpose of
privilege separation. In this case, the LPS system return an error code to
the calling function.
Before Executing the Restricted Function The LPS system veriﬁes that
it has successfully reduced the privileges of the child process before it trans-
fers control to the restricted function. Should there be some error condition
that prevents LPS from reducing its privileges, the system will not execute
the restricted function. In this case, LPS transmits an extended error code
on the pipe back to the privileged parent process and terminates. The par-
ent process generates an error code and returns this to the calling function.
If the Child Process does not Terminate Correctly The parent process
waits a limited amount of time for the restricted child process to ﬁnish and
terminate. Should the child process not ﬁnish in time the LPS system in
the parent process returns an error code to the calling function. Another,
similar, situation is when the child process crashes. In this case, the LPS
system notices the crash and returns an error code to the calling function.
Received Data is Invalid After the child has ﬁnished executing the re-
stricted function, the LPS system transmits state information back to the
parent process. This data is thoroughly veriﬁed by the parent process as
described earlier and should an error be detected, such as an attempt to
write more data to a buﬀer than it can hold, the LPS system will not apply
the state in the parent process but return an error to the calling function.
4 Indeed the program could get a signal from the operating system, but the chance that
the program could recover from this situation and resume normal execution is very low.
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3.1 Integrating LPS Errors in an Existing System
We want to apply privilege separation to programs that are not originally
developed with this in mind, so we cannot rely on any existing mechanisms
for handling errors that originate from the privilege separation. In all cases
of error, the LPS system transfers the error information to the privileged pro-
cess where it is delivered as a return value and an extended error information.
Unfortunately, there is no universal mechanism for propagating the error in-
formation into the host program, as there is not a single universal way of
writing programs. When integrating LPS into a host program we require the
engineer performing the integration to also integrate the error codes that LPS
may return into the error handling system of the host program.
In some cases this might be very simple. In the simplest form the developer
can just check if the LPS call succeeded, and if not, terminate the program.
This strategy is useful in situations where each client is handled by a diﬀerent
instance (process) of the program. Only a single user will be aﬀected by this
termination.
If the program uses the same instance to service multiple clients, this
simple error handling is not recommended, as it could make a denial of service
attack possible. In this case the developer integrating LPS must make sure
that the LPS error is handled as any other fatal error for the active user. It
is important that the error information is propagated in such as way that no
part of the privileged program is dependant of state that should have been
present only if the function call had succeeded.
4 Experiments
To determine the performance of the LPS system we designed and performed
an experiment consisting of several test cases. The purpose of this experiment
was to estimate the imposed time overhead when using the LPS privilege sepa-
ration system. We wanted to investigate the time consumption when transfer-
ring a small amount of state components (”dry run”) and when transferring
a a signiﬁcant amount of state components back to the privileged process.
We also wanted to investigate the impact of operating system choice and the
computer speed on the LPS system performance. We designed two test cases
to execute in three diﬀerent operating systems on two diﬀerent computer sys-
tems. Each test case was executed three times on each (operating system,
computer system) pair, giving us 18 measurement points per test. We use the
mean value from the three tests in this paper.
The experiment was carried out on two diﬀerent computer systems. The
ﬁrst system (System A) is a few years old but systems of this capacity are still
used as servers where privilege separation might be considered. The second
system (System B) was selected because it was the most powerful PC system
easily available to us.
81
Mellstrand
System A System B
Vendor Name Compaq Deskpro EN SFF Dell Optiplex 260 GX
Processor Intel Pentium II Intel Pentium 4
Processor Speed 400 MHz 2.7 GHz
RAM 160 Mb 512 Mb
Table 1
Computer systems used for experiments
4.1 Operating Systems
The experiment was carried out on three diﬀerent operating systems; FreeBSD 5 ,
OpenBSD 6 and Linux 7 . We installed the operating systems without any
graphical environment (X11), but did not tune the installation in any other
way. We used the respective standard kernel for each operating system as
installed by the installation program (GENERIC for the two BSDs and the
standard RedHat kernel for the Linux installation) 8 .
The decision to use these three operating systems in the experiment was
based on the following conditions;
Linux is the most wide-spread free Unix-like operating system, used on
millions of computers connected to the Internet. It is important for us to
support this operating system. FreeBSD is used by many large web serving
farms on the Internet, including Yahoo! and others. OpenBSD is an operating
system developed with security as one of the main objectives. We believe
it is important to support and benchmark this platform for security-related
research.
4.2 Test Cases
We used two test cases in the experiment; the ﬁrst was a small function taking
an int integer as parameter and returning a value calculated from the function
f(x) = x + 1. The payload data transferred back to the privileged process
is the return value for the function. This data is a 32 bit (4 byte) integer
on all test platforms. The function was implemented in the C programming
language with this following source code:
int func( int x ) {
5 FreeBSD 4.8-RELEASE, the most recent stable version available when the test was carried
out (2003-04-16).
6 OpenBSD 3.2, the most recent stable version available when the test was carried out.
7 RedHat Linux 8, Linux Kernel Version 2.4.18-14.
8 A complete speciﬁcation of each environment is available on the authors web page. This
speciﬁcation includes start up messages (dmesg) with device probing output and other
technical information about the systems on which the experiment was carried out.
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return x+1;
}
The second test case was designed to modify signiﬁcantly more state than
in the ﬁrst test case. Here the function writes an exclamation mark in every
byte in the ﬁrst kilobyte of memory pointed to by its in parameter. The
payload to transfer back to the privileged process is the modiﬁed buﬀer of 1
kB (1024 bytes). We believe that one kilobyte of state is more than enough for
a typical program, but as we will later see, the amount of state transferred does
not signiﬁcantly aﬀect performance. The implementation for this function is:
#define SIZE 1024
void func( char * pData ) {
memset( pData , ’!’ , SIZE );
}
The complete source code for both tests is available in the LPS package which
can be downloaded from the authors web page.
4.3 Experiment Procedures
For each computer system and operating system the following procedure was
followed;
(1) The operating system was installed on the computer system. For Linux
we used the Server proﬁle, for FreeBSD we installed the set Minimal
and for OpenBSD we used a default installation. We did not install a
graphical environment on the computers.
(2) The computer was restarted.
(3) We built the executables from the same source code with the default
compiler available on the system.
(4) Each test was executed three times. We used the physical console (display
and keyboard connected to the computer) and did not pipe either input
or output of the test program.
We did not separately measure the time taken to execute the actual function
from the time consumed by the privilege separation, but assumed all time
was consumed by the privilege separation. Also, we have used real functions
(that calculate a value or modify a buﬀer) rather than dummy functions. The
reason for this is that we wanted to make sure that the functions succeed
(which is very easy to check from their return values) and that we wanted to
avoid possible compiler optimizations that might otherwise have eliminated
dummy functions. The two functions that we used as test cases are so simple
that we believe it safe to ignore their parts of the total execution time.
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4.4 Results and Conclusions from the Experiment
The results from the experiment is presented in Table 2. We notice that the
execution of both test cases take signiﬁcantly longer time on FreeBSD than on
the other systems. We have currently not investigated this diﬀerence further,
but our hypothesis is that a FreeBSD process has more state that must be
copied by the kernel when a process is forked. We also notice a large diﬀerence
for OpenBSD and Linux on the diﬀerent test systems, a diﬀerence that we do
not see in the case of FreeBSD.
Operating System System A System B
Test Case 1
FreeBSD 5.179 4.145
OpenBSD 1.881 0.5553
Linux 1.734 0.6540
Test Case 2
FreeBSD 5.198 4.154
OpenBSD 2.127 0.6407
Linux 1.759 0.6730
Table 2
Execution time in milliseconds for LPS
Overall, however, we were surprised of the low overhead imposed when
using LPS. On a modern computer system running Linux or OpenBSD, the
overhead of using privilege separation is less than one millisecond, even with
one kilobyte of state to transfer and without any tuning of the systems. We
believe that with this low overhead it is possible to use the LPS on many
diﬀerent platforms and in many diﬀerent places in a single application. Should
there be any doubts of the quality of a particular part of a program we can
use LPS to isolate that part without losing much performance.
5 Comparisons
One of the most well-known systems today that uses privilege separation is the
OpenSSH ssh daemon developed by the OpenBSD team. In their approach a
large portion of the program (the ssh daemon) executes under lesser privileges
and communicates bidirectionally with a privileged supervisor process. The
two processes also have means of communication through a special heap that
is stored in memory shared between the two processes. The privilege sepa-
ration in OpenSSH is described in detail in [5]. In this section we present a
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comparison between the privilege separation model used in OpenSSH and the
LPS system. We compare the two methods from four perspectives; security,
portability, performance and integration time.
5.1 Security
In the OpenSSH model a vast majority of the program code is placed in an
unprivileged process. The unprivileged process sends requests to the privileged
process over a pipe and the privileged part veriﬁes the request and, if accepted,
carries it out. Only two processes are used throughout the life of a session (a
single privileged and a single unprivileged process) and these two processes
communicate bidrectionally.
With the LPS system only potentially risky functions of the program ex-
ecute with lesser privileges and when such a part is done executing, the child
process dies (a single privileged and multiple unprivileged processes). The
user land communication between the unprivileged and privileged process is
unidirectional, the unprivileged process transmits state information back to
the privileged process just before it dies.
In the LPS system it is up to the engineer that implements privilege sepa-
ration to determine which parts that should execute with lesser permissions:
In the OpenSSH case essentially all code is placed in the unprivileged part.
We believe that this is an advantage for the OpenSSH model as more code
is placed under restrictions than what will typically be done when using the
LPS system.
However, by using a model with temporary children (a single privileged
and multiple unprivileged processes) that die when they have carried out a re-
quest, it is possible to execute the diﬀerent unprivileged children with diﬀerent
privileges. For example, code that requires super user privileges to access the
systems password ﬁle but does not require ﬁle system access can be executed
in a child process with these permission set while code that requires ﬁle system
access but not with super user privileges can be set to have these permissions.
By using temporary child processes we can increase the ﬂexibility of how to
restrict a particular unprivileged child process, which we see as a great beneﬁt
with the LPS system.
Also by using temporary child processes, we can eliminate the consequences
of some programming errors, such as memory and ﬁle descriptor leaks, that are
not strictly security related, but that may result in denial-of-service attacks.
Any state in the unprivileged process that we are not interested in is left in
that process when it dies for the operating system to clean up.
5.2 Portability
The LPS system currently executes on three diﬀerent operating systems from
the same code base and is not dependent of complex operating system sup-
ported features such as descriptor passing or the use of special heaps, which is
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used in the OpenSSH model. The LPS system was designed with portability
in mind and we expect to port it to even more platforms that support the
POSIX API 9 .
5.3 Performance
We have not performed any measurements on the OpenSSH solution, but from
the description of the system we have, we believe it to be as fast or faster than
the LPS system. We do not believe that performance is a problem for either
solution though. As we have shown, the LPS system executes with less than
one millisecond of overhead time on a modern computer and the additional
time required to execute a program with privileges separated is in our opinion
negligible. We doubt that any user would notice the slight delay imposed by
the use of LPS even if several privilege separated calls are performed in a
program.
As the LPS system uses a new child processes for each separation we are
unsure if it is suitable in a real time environment, as the time to complete the
fork call may diﬀer signiﬁcantly dependent on the system load.
5.4 Integration Time
The OpenSSH system for privilege separation requires much larger modiﬁca-
tions in existing code than what is typically required by the LPS system. We
have made very few assumptions on how a program is structured when we de-
signed LPS and this gives us an advantage when applying privilege separation
in programs that were not design with this as an initial requirement.
As we have shown in this paper a function call is simply wrapped with a
few lines of source code for executing the call with separated privileges through
the LPS system. There are no additional requirements imposed on the host
system and no other initialization is needed.
Another type of comparisons is between theoretical models and engineering
models as a mean to achieve safe execution of unreliable software. We have
in this paper argued for merits of an engineering approach since arguably
security is a context dependent process. However, we also support, of course,
guiding principles of engineering grounded in theoretical models. To that end
it is illustrative to assess models of secure composition of untrusted code as in
[3]. What we have shown in our paper that there is a pragmatic way (LPS)
to interpret the results of [6].
In [6] Sewell and Vitec introduces wrappers as encapsulations of compo-
nents and use their box-pi calculus to prove desired security properties of
(ﬁltered) interactions between components modelled as a causal type system.
9 The LPS system requires the fork, pipe, read, write and poll system calls. These are
available on virtually all modern operating systems. On some systems where poll is not
available the same functionality is available through the select call and this can be easily
emulated in user land.
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From an engineering point of view, however, it is not a simple task to
identify the ﬁlter/wrapper for general components. Not to say the problems
of a secure implementation of the ﬁlter/wrapper itself that could be complex
if the components/interactions are complex. On the other hand we can argue
that the wrapping/ﬁltering idea of Sewell and Vitec applied to our LPS system
provides a formal model for our treatment of untrusted code components where
wrapping has been implemented as our privilege separation mechanism (LPS)
in section 2.2. The discussions in sections 2.2 and 3 could then be supported
by the proofs of the model in the paper [6].
We ﬁrmly believe that this kind of interplays between formal models and
engineering principles are important components in achieving safe execution
of unreliable software.
6 Conclusions and Further Work
We have described the LPS privilege separation system, a system that enables
us to execute non-reliable C and C++ software components in a trusted way.
By using the LPS system it is possible to separate privileges in existing and
new software systems with a minimal change required to existing source code
and without having to adopt new software design methodologies. The LPS
system is a portable and ﬂexible system that does not rely on special features
in the operating system, but can be used in a variety of programs that execute
on several diﬀerent operating systems.
Also we have shown that the overhead imposed by using privilege separa-
tion is less than one millisecond on a modern computer, a negligible overhead
in most cases. We have also presented a comparison between privilege separa-
tion as implemented in the LPS system and as implemented in the OpenSSH
ssh daemon.
We believe that privilege separation and the use of LPS is an inexpensive
and fast way to increase dependability in new and existing software. Our plans
on further work include applying the LPS privilege separation system to a
larger software system that is currently executed as a monolithic process with
super-user privileges. Also we plan on further investigation of the performance
issues that we found when experimenting on FreeBSD.
We also plan on investigating other techniques that can be used to execute
unreliable software safely, such as the use of embedded virtual machines. We
believe that programs constructed using strongly typed languages and com-
piled for virtual machines are very interesting from a security perspective and
we would like to investigate if a system such as LPS could be integrated in a
virtual machine to provide an even higher level of security.
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